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Ever think the day would come when the Internet and your phone
worked as one to expand communications beyond all boundaries?'
L Introduction - The Rise of the Internet Empire
In the new economy information age, the ability to capture and utilize the
means of communication as a capital resource could mean the difference
between a profitable and a bankrupt business enterprise.2 More than any other
commercial activity, securities trading has recognized the potential opportuni-
ties this information revolution creates.3 This revolution has had two effects:
the growth of corporate websites for the dissemination of information to the
public,4 and the increased reliance by the public on the Internet as a means of
information gathering and financial research.' Concurrent with this growth
has emerged the need to develop a regulatory structure adapted to the intrica-
cies of the Internet as it relates to securities laws.' This Note addresses the
1. INC. THE MAGAZINE FOR GROWING COMPANIS, Feb. 2000, at 34 (quoting advertise-
ment for Vstreamcom).
2. See Brett Duval Fromson, Where the Next Fortunes Will Be Made; The Secret Is
Spotting a Major Trend and Then ClimbingAboard at Just the Right Moment, FORTUN, Dec.
5,1988, at 185 (discussing value of information communication to emerging companies).
3. See RobertA. Prentice, The Future of Corporate Disclosure: The lnterne4 Securities
Fraud, and Rule 10b-5, 47 EMORY L.J. 1, 2 (1998) (discussing growth of Internet as medium
of communication for financial information). See generally Robert A. Robertson, Personal
Investing in Cyberspace and the Federal Securities Laws, 23 SEc. REG. L.J. 347 (1996) (out-
lining effect of Internet on personal investment decisions and Securities and Exchange Com-
mission's (SEC) reaction to such changes); Lourdes Gonzalez & Diane Mage Roberts, Internet-
Based and Other Online Trading Systems, INsIGfrrs, July 1997, at 8 (discussing development
of Internet capable trading systems and needed protections for such transactional systems); John
C. Wilcox, Electronic Communication and Proxy Voting: The Governance Implications of
Shareholders in Cyberspace, INSIGIrrs, Mar. 1997, at 8 (noting SEC aggressiveness in promot-
ing use of Internet as tool for financial markets).
4. See infra notes 15-21 and accompanying text (discussing growth of websites run by
publicly traded corporations).
5. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text (noting development of Internet as
research medium for public).
6. See generally David M. Cielusniak, Note, You Cannot Fight What You Cannot See:
Securities Regulation on the Internet, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 612,613-14 (1998) (discussing
possibility of securities fraud on Internet and regulatory challenges posed by such fraud); Karen
Donovan, The Web: A ValidProxyfor Proxy-Fight Notices?, NAT'L L., Jan. 29, 1996, at BI
(discussing SEC regulation of proxy contests on Internet in context of RJR Nabisco case);
Andrew Kandel, Securities Fraud and the Internet How New York Regulators Are Keeping
Up, WALLsTRETLAWYERCOM, Jan. 1998, at 8 (explaining how Internet presents unique risk
of fraudulent securities marketing). But see Joseph F. Celia M & John Reed Stark, SEC En-
forcement and the Internet Meeting the Challenge of the Next Millennium -A Program for
the Eagle and the Internet, 52 Bus. LAW. 815,835 (1997) (arguing that current SEC regulations
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potential liability under Rule lOb-57 facing companies that operate webpages
with hyperlinks' to analyst reports that contain inaccurate or misleading infor-
mation.'
Part I of this Note discusses the growth of the Internet as a tool of finan-
cial information delivery by companies and the increasing reliance by the
public on the Internet as a means of gathering such information." Part II of
this Note provides a background to Rule lOb-5 and analyzes its potential
application to a corporate website with a hyperlink to an analyst report con-
taining misleading information.1 Part I then gives policy arguments in
support of extending IOb-5 liability to the aforementioned situation. 2 Part IV
of this Note outlines potential strategies through which a company may avoid
such liability yet maintain hyperlinks to analyst reports through the use of
disclaimers and staleness provisions. 3 Finally, Part V of this Note concludes
that successful regulation must balance the interests of both investors and
corporations. 4
can be adapted to Internet without development of new regulatory structu). However, even
Celia and Stark recognized the need for the SEC to address seriously the changes the Internet
poses to securities regulation, writing:
The synergy created by the joining of the Internet with global capital markets
creates an ever-changing and developing investment emporium which has not only
changed the way the players think but also the way the scofflaws think. Above all,
the [SEC] must position itself to respond quickly to the concerns of the investing
public while also considering the mores of the Internet community.
Id. at 847.
7. See infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (analyzing Rule 1Ob-5 and its potential
application to corporate websitcs).
8. See JoHN,. HEwrr & JAMES B. CARLSON, SECURTIES PRAcncEANDELEcTRoNac
TECHNOLoGY § 4.03[2][c] (1998) (explaining use of hyperlink as device through which one
website can be connected to another). A hyperlink allows a user to navigat easily between
different websites without initiating a new search and beginning at a fresh page. Id.
9. See infra notes 42-47 and discussion (describing meaning of misleading information
in context of Rule 10b-5).
10. See infra notes 16-29 and accompanying text (discussing growth of Internet and use
as financial tool).
11. See infra notes 30-75 and accompanying text (analyzing application of Rule lob-S
to hyperlink from corporate website to analyst report).
12. See infra notes 76-104 and accompanying text (outlining policy arguments in favor
of application of Rule 10b-5 to corporate hyperlink to analyst report).
13. See infra notes 105-185 and accompanying text (providing potential strategies to
avoid liability for hyperlinks from company website to analyst report).
14. See infra notes 186-201 and accompanying text (discussing proper regulatory balance
for corporate websites).
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A. The Growth of the Corporate Website
Corporations are rapidly expanding the use of the Intermet as a means to
fulfill SEC disclosure requirements and otherwise to disseminate financial
information to the public."5 The use of a company webpage as a means of
communication to the public arguably creates enormous savings in contrast
to paper-based mailings and distribution. 6 In June 1993 the entire world wide
web consisted of only 130 websites. 7 Three years later, the total number of
webpages had grown to over 650,000, and this number continues to rise
exponentially.1
8
A large proportion of the Internet now is dominated by corporate home
pages.' Today, according to the National Investor Relations Institute, approx-
imately ninety percent of all publicly traded companies in the United States
have launched their own corporate websites. Practitioners have published
manuals instructing attorneys onhow to create a home page for their corporate
clients. " How many of these corporate websites are being accessed by the
public for the purposes of gathering financial information concerning potential
investment decisions remains a question.
B. The Internet and the Public
Even more striking than the increasing use ofthe Internet by corporations
is the growing reliance on the Internet as a means of financial research by the
public.Y Moreover, recent research indicates that by 2001 there will be
15. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 2-3 (discussing growth of corporate website usage);
Gloria Santon, More Corporations Using 'Net to Reach Investors, NAT'L L.J., July 14,1997,
at B16 (detailing use of Internet by corporations as tool of communication to reach potential
investors).
16. See Santona, supra note 15, at B16 (noting that several companies already have
distributed their annual reports electronically and others have used Internet as means of dis-
tributing proxy materials).
17. Clifford Lynch, Searching the Internet, SCL AM., Mar. 1997, at 52,53.
18. Id. at 53.
19. See Simon Petravick & John Gillett, Financial Reporting on the World Wide Web,
MoMr. ACCT., July 1996, at 26 (noting that by May 1996, 69% of Fortune 150 companies had
websites).
20. See Proactive Corporate Practices Recommended byABA Panelists, See. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA), 1113-14 (Aug. 20, 1999) (noting increase in number of corporate websites and
arguing that corporate counsel should carefully scrutinize information on corporate homepages).
See generally Paul Davies, Huge Growth in Net Forecast; Business Leaders Expect High Cost
to Fall, Survey Says, ARIZ. REPUBLiC, Apr. 12, 1997, at E9 (projectingrapid growth in use of
Internet by corporations).
21. See HEWITr & CARLSON, supra note 8, § 4 (providing instruction on construction and
maintenance of simple web page).
22. See Alexander C. (Gavis, The Offering and Distribution of Securities in Cyberspace:
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approximately 9.3 million investment accounts handled directly over the
Interet.' In pursuit of these members of the online investing public, over
150 brokerages are now available on the Internet. 4
The public attraction to online investing is enormous. Internet investors
have the opportunity to receive access to free and inexpensive investment
information.' Moreover, investing on the Internet provides the public lower
transaction costs than traditional brokers,26 twenty-four hour access to account
information," and portfolio tracking services.' Given these two trends, the
growth of the number of Internet users combined with the expanding number
of corporate home pages, it is clear that the regulation of corporate disclosure
policies over the Internet will become increasingly important. 9
ff. The Traditional Duty to Correct Misleading Statements
A. Background to Rule 10b-5 and SEC Anti-Fraud Regulation"
The primary mechanism used by the SEC to regulate fraud with respect
to informal (or "soft") communications between a company and the public is
Rule 1Ob-5? ° Promulgated in 1942, Rule lOb-5 mirrors Section 17(a) of the
A Review ofRegulatory and Industry Initiatives, 52 Bus. LAW. 317,319-20 (1996) (describing
growing number of personal computer (PC) owners and Internet users worldwide). But see
CLIFFORD STOII, SIIJCONSNAKE OIL 16-17 (1995) (arguing thattotal number oflnteret users
in United States is exaggerated).
23. See ChristinaK. McGlosson, Comment, Who Needs WallStreet? TheDilemma ofReg-
ulatingSecurities Trading in Cyberspace, 5 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 305,312 (1997) (quoting
ForresterResearch estimates concerning number ofonlineinvestment accounts in 2001); see also
Cielusniak, supra note 6, at 617 (estimating total number ofonline investment accounts in 2001
to be twenty million).
24. Abmad Diba, They Want You Wired, FORTUNE, Dec. 20, 1999, at 113 (discussing
pursuit of online investors by numerous online Internet brokers).
25. See Leah Nathans Spiro & Linda Himelstein, With the World Wide Web, Who Needs
Wall Street?, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 29, 1996, at 120 (discussing various benefits of online account
maintenance); The Web 'rPlethora ofInformation and Services Means Financial Planning in
No Longer a Spectator Sport, FORTUNE, Dec. 1, 1999, at 236 (noting that Yahoo.comr and
Excite.com provide free links to over 1,400 subcategories of financial information and reports).
26. See Spiro & Himeistein, supra note 25, at 120 (discussing value of lower commission
costs to active traders and total savings affecting portfolios).
27. See id.; Daniel Spulber, Clock Wise: Customer Convenience is the Key toEcommerce,
BUSINESS 2.0, Mar. 2000, at 214 ( "Ameritrade and E*Trade connect investors to markets for
financial assets.... By adding convenience, companies engaged in electronic commerce stand
to earn returns from speeding up tansaetions.").
28. Id.
29. See supra note 6 (discussing problems with securities regulation in Intemet environ-
ment).
30. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.FR. § 240.10b- (1999).
Rule lob-5 states:
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1933 Act31 except that Rule lOb-5 extends to misstatements occurring in con-
nection with either "a purchase or sale of any security," while Section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act focuses only on fraudulent sales or offers to sell 2.3  The SEC
has utilized the broad language contained in Rule lOb-5 in a variety of anti-
fraud contexts. 33 Moreover, the Supreme Court has recognized a private right
of action implied within Rule 1Ob-5. 4 Although limited in scope in recent
years, the Rule lOb-5 implied remedy remains apowerful tool for class-action
suits against public corporations 5
To sustain a viable 1Ob-5 claim, a plaintiff must show fraud or deceit,
which requires proving that the defendant acted with scienter36 in connection
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
31. Securities Act of 1933 § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994).
32. See icl (statingthat "anyperson acquiring such security" has cause ofactionforuntrue
statements of material fact contained in registration statement).
33. See generallyPrimary Cam Investors, Seven v. PHP Healthcare Corp., 986 F.2d 1208
(8th Cir. 1993) (finding lOb-5 violation could be based on nondisclosure of planned public
offering but holding no violation occurred in case due to plaintiffs inability to show right to
convert company interests into common stock upon offering); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc.,
635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying Rule lOb-5 to allegations of insider trading); Drachman
v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1971) (utilizing 10b-5 as basis for liability in corporate
mismanagement context where fraud is also found in underlying securities transaction).
34. See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 10 (1971) (con-
cluding that 10b-5 offers protection for petitioner corporation, when corporation was defrauded
by illegal sale of securities owned by corporation).
35. See generally Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (requiring in class
action that alleged conduct be deceptive); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976)
(concluding in class action that more than mere negligence is required to sustain 10b-5 claim);
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (stating that class action plain-
tiffs bringing lOb-5 claim must be either purchasers or sellers of securities in question).
36. See Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201 (concluding lOb-5 addresses practices "that involve
some element of scienter"); see also In re Wells Fargo Se. Litig., 12 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir.
1993) (finding plaintiffs must show that defendant "knew or recklessly ignored that its chal-
lenged statements were misleading"); Breard v. Sachnoff& Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 144
(2d Cir. 1991) (finding plaintiffs may include allegations of recklessness to support 10b-5
scienter requirement); Backman v. Polaroid Corp., Nos. 89-1171, 89-1172,1990 WL 3832, at
*11-12 (1st Cir. Jan 23,1990) (concluding recklessness sufficient basis for lob-5 liability).
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with the purchase or sale of any security.37 Moreover, because Rule lOb-5
requires the establishment of a fraud claim, the plaintiff must prove the ele-
ments of common law fraud - reliance,38 materiality,"9 causation, 40 and dam-
ages.4 1 The Supreme Court has provided some guidance in their application
of these common law requirements to securities litigation. 42 To determine
whether a misstatement is material, the courts will examine the types of infor-
mation that a reasonable investor would deem important in maldng investment
decisions.' This inquiry into the materiality of a particular statement is
highly dependent upon the specific circumstances of the case and the totality
of the information available to the investor in the marketplace." Likewise,
courts are reluctant to make any determinations with respect to reliance with-
out careful consideration of the specific facts at hand.45 However, the Su-
37. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 730-49 (discussing requirement that plaintiff be
purchaser or seller of security in question). The courts have relaxed the strict seller/purchaser
requirement to allow individual shareholders in a shareholder derivative suit brought on behalf
of a corporation defrauded in connection with its purchase or sale of securities to acquire
standing. See Frankel v. Slotkin, 984 F.2d 1328, 1332-33 (2d Cir. 1993) (allowing shareholder
to maintain derivative action on allegations that corporation fraudulently was induced to sell its
equity holdings).
38. See List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457,462 (2d Cir. 1965) (noting that "[t]hus,
to the requirement that the indiMdualplaintiffmust have acted upon the fact misrepresented, is
added the parallel requirement that a reasonable man would also have acted upon the fact mis-
represented").
39. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,231 (1987) (recognizing incorporation of
common law materiality requirement into Rule 10b-5).
40. See Wilson v. Ruffa & Hanover, P.C., 844 F.2d 81, 85-6 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussing
theory of transaction causation in securities litigation) vacated sub noma. Wilson v. Santine
Exploration & Drilling Corp, 8 72 F.2d 1124 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Fortune Sys. Sec. Litig., 680
F. Supp. 1360, 1365 (ND. Cal. 1987) (stating loss causation requires plaintiff to show his
damage "is a result of defendant's wrongdoing").
41. See Wool v. Tandem Computers Inc., 818 F.2d 1433,1437 (9th Cir. 1987) (using "out
of pocket" rule to measure damages when plaintiff was injured by fraudulent market transac-
tions); Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355,367 (8th Cir. 1986) (determining that measure
of damages in securities fraud claim is equivalent to actual damages of plaintiff).
42. Of the traditional common law requirements, only reliance and materiality are relevant
to the purpose of this Note. Although the Court has imposed significant limitations upon the
elements of causation and damages in the securities context, such developments are outside the
scope of the present discussion.
43. See Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 231-32 (discussing development of Court's materiality
jurisprudence). The Court in Basic Inc. used the opportunity to apply the materiality test
adopted for proxy disclosure in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976),
to the lOb-5 context See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing importance of reli-
ance in lOb-5 claim).
44. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,232-41 (1988) (analyzing proper amount
of information necessary to maximize investor knowledge and adopting fact specific standard).
45. See generally Longden v. Sunderman, 737 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1990) (denying
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preme Court has recognized the "fraud on the market" presumption of reliance
through which a plaintiff may prove reliance by showing that a misstatement
adversely affected the market price of the security involved.46 If a potential
plaintiff is able to meet these basic requirements, a viable 1Ob-5 claim may be
sustained in cases in which a corporation has made or adopted misleading
statements.
47
B. The Duty to Correct Third Party Statements
Although the general rule is that a company is not required to correct
misleading third party statements, 45 this duty may exist when the company
implicitly adopts the statements of the third party.49 This duty has arisen most
often in relation to analyst reports.5" When an analyst and his report serve as
intermediaries between a company and the public, this implicit adoption may
occur in three potential ways.
First, a company may have a duty to correct a misleading report under
Rule 10b-5 when the company has distributed the analyst's report with other
companymaterials to the public." inm reRasterOps Corp. Securities Litiga-
tion, 2 the RasterOps court rejected the assertion that the company was merely
a distribution medium for the analyst's report. Instead the court concluded
that, "RasterOps' attemptto relegate itselfto the status ofamailcarrier orglori-
fled delivery boy is unconvincing. Bypassing out the favorable analyst report,
summary judgment of 10b-5 claim thus indicating questions of reliance are highly factual);
Becher v. Farkas, 717 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Il. 1989) (denying summary judgment on 10b-5
claim for similar reasons).
46. Basic Inc., 485 U.S. at 241-47 (recognizing fraud on market theory as adequate means
for plaintiff to prove reliance in 10b-5 action thus satisfying common law requirements for fraud
claim).
47. See Bentley v. Legent Corp., 849 F. Supp. 429,431-32 (ED. Va. 1994) (noting that
once projection or prediction is disclosed it must satisfy materiality test if inaccurate).
48. See State Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 654 F.2d 843, 850 (2d Cir. 1981) (con-
cluding that "[a] company has no duty to correct or verify rumors in the marketplace unless
those rumors can be attributed to the company"). The court went on to conclude that a company
has no duty to correct rumors once discovered unless failure to so could be considered reckless.
Id. at 851.
49. See infra notes 50-65 and accompanying text (discussing theories upon which adop-
tion of third party statements may be based).
50. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (providing detailed discussion of In re
Presstek; Inc., Exchahge Act Release No. 34-39472, 66 S.E.C. Docket 328, 1997 WL 784548
(S.E.C. Dec. 22, 1997)).
51. See infra notes 52-54 and discussion (detailing manner through which distribution
can create implied adoption of analyst report by company).
52. [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,467 at 91,193 (N.D. Cal.
Oct 31, 1994).
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RasterOps clearly was implying that the company agreed with the forecasts
contained in the reports." 3 Other courts have reached similar findings of
liability when a company has distributed misleading analyst reports.'
Second, courts will find implicit adoption of an analyst report when a
company provides information to the analyst or participates in the preparation
ofthe production ofthe report."5 The most explicit statement ofthis "prepara-
tion" based liability is found in In re Presstek Inc., 6 a case in which the
chairman ofthe company reviewed an analyst's report prior to distribution and
corrected some of the financial information. 7 However, the chairman left
intact and unaltered an overly optimistic projection of per share earnings for
1997. The Commission concluded that the chairman "impliedly repre-
53. In re RasterOps Corp. See. Litig., [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 98,467 at 91,195 (NJ). Cal. Oct. 31, 1994). In RasterOps, the court considered a
lOb-5 claim against the company alleging that officers of the corporation supplied false in-
formation to analysts in order to generate reports and then distributed those reports to potential
investors. Id. The officers had contacted analysts at Donaldson, Lufldn, and Jenrette and told
those analysts that the business was strong and the company would reach earnings estimates for
fiscal year 1992. Id. The officers then obtained draft copies of the analysts' reports and
circulated them among potential investors. Id. The court found that "[t]he act of circulating the
reports amounts to an implied representation that the information in the reports is accurate or
reflects the company's views." Id. Moreover, the court determined that explicit ratification
was not necessary for a finding of liability under Rule lOb-5. Id. Thus, the court refused to
dismiss RasterOps's motion to dismiss the allegations for failure to state a claim. Id.
54. See, e.g., Stack v. Lobo, 903 F. Supp. 1361, 1371 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing
requirement of implicit adoption of report as basis for liability); Strasaman v. Fresh Choice, Inc.,
No. C-95-20017 RPA, 1995 WL 743728 at *12 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 7,1995) (dismissing complaint
alleging post-publication ratification of analyst reports when plaintiff failed to show defendant
circulated reports); see also In re Cypress Semiconductor Sec. Litig., 891 F. Supp. 1369, 1377
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (noting that "[d]istributing analysts' reports to potential investors may, depend-
ing on the circumstances, amount to an implied representation that the reports are accurate").
55. See infra notes 56-60 and accompanying text (describing preparation of report as
basis for implicit adoption of analyst report by company).
56. See In re Presstek, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-39472,66 S.E.C. Docket 328,
1997 WL 784548, at *10 (S.E.C. Dec. 22, 1997) (determining that preparation and editing of
analyst reports by company constitutes pro-publication implicit adoption of information in
report). In Pressek, the Commission considered a lOb-5 claim against the company for the
distribution and publication of false and misleading information. Id. at *1. Senior management
officers at the company reviewed, edited, and distributed an analyst's report that overstated
earnings estimates for fiscal year 1997; the Chairman had revised the sales projection for one of
Presstek's products but failed to correct sales figures for another product that he knew were
incorrect. Id. at *2. The Commission concluded that by "providing forecasts that were incorpo-
rated into the initial draft PMG report [and] editing the report prior to publication ... Presstek
is liable for the report's material misrepresentations under... the entanglement... thcor[y]...
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sented... that those he did not revise were accurate 59 by altering the earn-
ings projections for 1996 but leaving in place the 1997 figures. Despite this
potential exposure to liability under Rule 1Ob-5, vast numbers of companies
continue to review and revise analyst reports.'c
Finally, a court may impose liability when a company is aware of an
analyst's report and makes statements indicating a level of comfort with the
conclusions of the report.6' Such liability arises most often when a company
expresses the belief that analyst projections are attainable by the company.
For example, in In re Adobe Systems Inc. Securities Litigation,' the chief
financial officer answered questions concerning analyst projections of the
company's earnings estimates in which he expressed the view that he sup-
ported a "consensus estimate of $2.10."'  The court concluded that such
public comments constituted adoption of the analyst's projections and thus
could serve as the basis for a private 1Ob-5 claim' 6
The aforementioned cases suggest that companies should take special
caution when dealing with analyst's reports, especially when communicating
such information to the general public. Courts are likely to attribute state-
ments in such reports to the companies themselves, and consequently, the
companies will find themselves subject to a duty to correct any misleading
information in the reports. 5 This risk of entanglement will become more
important as nonverbal acts, such as the act of establishing a link to an ana-
lyst's report from a company's website, beginto serve as the basis for implicit
adoption.
59. Id. at *10.
60. See Put Away the Red Pencil, CFO MAGAZINE, March 1998, at 24 (reporting that
"78% of companies review analyst reports for factual accuracy").
61. See infra note 62-65 and accompanying text (discussing use of comfortability as basis
for implicit adoption of third party statement in analyst report context).
62. 767 F. Supp. 1023 (ND. Cal. 1991).
63. See In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 767 F. Supp. 1023, 1027 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(finding that statements indicating comfort with analyst projections constitute implicit adoption
of such projections). In Adobe Systems, the court considered whether a company, in reaction
to a recent stock price decline, could be liable for statements made by a company officer
indicating that a lower consensus estimate was supported by the corporation. Id. at 1025-26.
The court found that the statements, even if cautionary in nature, could still be overly optimistic
and misleading. Id. at 1028. In doing so, the court rejected the defendant's argument that an
overly broad definition of actionable projection statements would chill corporate communica-
tion with the general public. Id. Thus, the court refused to dismiss the defendant's motion to
dismiss the allegation for failure to state a viable lob-5 claim. Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally supra notes 42-44 (discussing duty to correct misleading statements
under Rule 10b-5).
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C. Application of Duty to Correct to a Company's Website
When a company links its website to an analyst's report containing
misleading information, a court may consider the link itself to be an implicit
adoption of the report.' The act of creating the connection between the
company and the report may serve as a means of distribution of the report,
similar to including the report in a mailing of other company materials.'
Moreover, the link arguably reflects a level of comfort by the company with
the information contained in the report.' Although litigation concerning this
issue has yet to be considered, the SEC has indicated that it views links
between different websites as creating a single electronic document.69 In
doing so, the SEC has indicated that Rule 1Ob-5 is applicable to both tradi-
tional, paper-based communication and electronically delivered information."
This duty to correct misleading information may extend to errors not
present at the time the company established the link." For example, if a
company creates a link to an analyst's site and the analyst subsequently
revises his report without informing the company, then the presence of the
link itself still may serve as the basis for implied adoption of the statements.72
66. For a general discussion of the concept of implicit adoption of third party statements
and a subsequent duty to correct such statements, see J. ROBERT BROWN, JR., THE REGU.ATION
OF CORPORATE DISCOSuRE § 3.04[5] (1999) (discussing duty to update or correct third party
statements in context of paper based communications).
67. See generally Prentice, supra note 3 (drawing comparisons between paper-based and
electronic-based communications for purposes of securities regulation); Gavis, supra note 22
(discussing corporate distribution of regulated materials through Internet).
68. See supra note 61-65 and accompanying text (analyzing comfortability as mechanism
of implicit adoption of third party statement).
69. See Use of Electronic Media for Delivery Purposes, Exchange Act Release No. 33-
7233, 60 S.E.C. Docket 1091, 1995 WL 588462, at *9 (S.E.C. Oct 6,1995) (determining, in
context of prospectus located on company's website, that "[t]he hyperlink function enables the
final prospectus to be viewed directly as if it were packaged in the same envelope as the sales
literature"); see also Kathleen M. Gibson, In a Dearth ofDisclosure Lies Exposure, NAT'L L.J.,
June 24, 1996, at B12 (arguing that technological advances make it more complicated to avoid
selective disclosure of corporate information).
70. See Exchange Act Release No. 33-7233, at *3 n.l (determining that "the liability pro-
visions of the federal securities laws apply equally to electronic and paper-based media").
71. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying discussion (analyzing concept of "alive"
statements in context of relianct and lOb-5 claims).
72. The meaning of communications within the context of securities regulation extends
to more than direct oral or printed materials; it can also include non-verbal conduct and other
forms of expression. See generally Safe Harbor Rule for Projections, Securities Act Release
6084, 1979 SEC LEXIS 1254, at *21-22 (June 25, 1979) (noting that "the Commission re-
minded issuers of their responsibility to make full and prompt disclosure.., where management
knows or has reason to know that its earlier statements no longer have a reasonable basis");
BROWN, supra note 66, at § 3.03[3] (discussing varied forms of communication regulated in
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Each day the link is present constitutes a reaffirmation by the company that
the information to which the site is connected is reliable. 3 At least one court
has supported a similar finding of a duty to correct with respect to paper-based
communications when a company became aware of misleading information
subsequent to the adoption of the report.74
However, the traditional duty to correct implicitly adopted statements of
a third party has been limited to an unchanging paper-based report orpresenta-
tion." To require a similar duty of companies with respect to an analyst's
website would necessitate the introduction of an elevated and continual duty
to review the information on the analyst's site to monitor for any changes or
new errors. This elevated duty of correction has yet to be addressed by either
the SEC or the courts; although the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 origi-
nally were designed as vehicles for consumer protection, it is unclear how
much protection the courts will provide to the public.
I. Justification for a Higher Duty to Correct
A. The Problem of Information Overload
As stated above, the duty to correct implicitly adopted statements of a
third party has, so fhr, been limited to an unchanging paper-based report or
presentation. To elevate this duty based solely upon the fact that a particular
communication was made through electronic media rather than through more
traditional forms would seem to create an unfair disparity in regulation. How-
ever, given the unique capabilities ofthe Internet to provide enormous amounts
of information quickly, the courts should adopt this duty in order to promote
informed decisionmaking by the public concerning investment decisions.76
securities context). The SEC believes there is a duty to correct noting:
[I]f the statements either have become inaccurate by virtue of subsequent events,
or are later discovered to have been false and misleading from the outset, and the
issuer knows or should know that persons are continuing to rely on all or any
material portion of the statements.
IM at *22.
73. This re-affirmation of the credibility of a particular source of communication may
derive support from the "comfortabity" theory of implicit adoption. See supra notes 62-65 and
accompanying text (discussing comfortability in context of implicit adoption).
74. See Backman v. Polaroid Corp., Nos. 89-1171, 89-1172, 1990 WL 3832, at *9 (lst
Cir. 1990) (concluding that when subsequent events make previous statement or communication
misleading company has duty to correct information (citing Greenfield v. Heublin, Inc., 742
F.2d 751,758 (3d Cir. 1984))).
75. See generally Celia & Stark, supra note 6 (discussing application of traditional SEC
regulation to emerging forms of communication).
76. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of
SecuriiesRegulation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1985) (analyzing changing role of SEC in modem
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The federal securities laws concerning disclosure of corporate informa-
tion initially were designed in order to combat the problem of limited informa-
tion;"' investors typically were defrauded or misled because access to informa-
tion concerning a potential investment was limited. " In the aftermath of the
stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression, congressional concerns
with the myriad of problems emanating from insiders taking advantage ofnon-
public information led to the passage of the Securities Act of 1934 and the
adoption of its open disclosure philosophy. 9
The Intemet poses the opposite problem inthat the speed and information
to which an individual has access is enormous. This may result in more
impulse decisionmaking as investors have the ability to review a company, to
read analyst reports, and to purchase stock in a company all within one quick
information-based economy); Robertson, supra note 3 (discussing effect of technology on
personal investment decisions and SEC reaction); Christopher Sharples, Policing Cyber-Fraud
on the World Wide Web, DAILY TEIEGURAPH, Mar. 24,1997, at 25 (discussing Internet and effect
on securities regulation); Spulber, supra note 27, at 214 (arguing that "[w]hether at work, at
home, or on the road, electronic communications promise substantial time savings").
77. See Gavis, supra note 22, at 323 (discussing development of SEC regulations and
Congressional modification of regulations).
78. See generaly LOUISD.BRANDEIS, OTHERPEOPLE'SMONEYANDHOWTHEBANKERS
USE IT 92 (1914) (discussing role of disclosure as means to combat insider trading); see also
Ted Smith, Congress Must First Learn to Surf the Inte4ne IfIt Ever Hopes to Catch the Next
Wave ofSecuritiesFraud, 17J.MARsHAILJ.CompuTER&IINo.L. 589,590-91 (1999). Smith
argued that the impact of fraudulent information threatens market stability, noting that
One risk that an investor faces when deciding to allocate funds to a particular in-
vestment is the integrity of the opportunity. If integrity is lacking in the investment
and it turns out to be a sham, the investor may lose his entire investment Securities
fraud is an issue that has plagued the SEC since its inception. Securities fraud not
only causes financial hardships on those caught up in the fraud, but it also jeopar-
dizes the integrity of the entire securities market. History has proven that incidents
of securities fraud are more prevalent when there is an increase in the popularity of
securities trading.... mhe Internet makes the opportunities to perpetuate securi-
ties fraud more complex and tougher to police than ever before.
Id.
79. See HR. REP. No. 73-1383, at 11 (1934) (discussing value of information to public
investors). The Report noted that
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities ... without having an
intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of the securities he buys
and sells. The idea of a free and open public market is built upon the theory that
competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair price of the security brings
about a situation where the market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.
Just as artificial manipulation tends to upset the true function of an open market,
so the hiding and secreting of important information obstructs the operations of the
markets as indices of real value. There cannot be honest markets without honest
publicity.
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session on the Internet."° Courts often have interpreted the disclosure philoso-
phy of the 1934 Act as a remedy to this problem.8' In TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc.,' the Supreme Court, in addressing the correct standard for
materiality in an action under § 14-a-9, expressed concern for the problem of
information overload.83 Specifically, the Courtnoted that "[s]ome information
is of such dubious significance that insistence on its disclosure may accom-
plish more harm than good .... [M]anagement's fear of exposing itself to
substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the shareholders in an ava-
lanche of trivial information - a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decisionmaking." 4 To reduce the potential of this occurring, which results
from the Internet's capability to deliver high-speed research materials, courts
80. See The Web's Plethora of Information, supra note 25, at 236 ("[TMhe Internet has
rapidly become capitalism's great equalizer .... Of course, speed and access to reams of
information can't make up for bad judgment"); Robert Reid, The Impulse Economy, BUsiNESS
2.0, Mar. 2000, at 284 (arguing that "[t]he tight link between the call to action and the response
within the Impulse Economy, coupled with the Web's unique auditability, gives marketers more
powerfil insight into the efficacy of their campaigns than they ever dreamed possible"). See
generally Gina Imperato,Reportfrom the Future: The Money Value of Time, FAST COMPANY,
Jan./Feb. 2000, at 40 (arguing that Internet provides new premium for value of time). Imperato
argued that:
We all understand, instinctively, the timeless logic behind the "time value of
money" - that a dollar received today is worth more than a dollar received a year
from now. But the new world of business requires an instinctive appreciation of a
different logic as well. Think of it as the "money value of time." Cutting-edge
people and companies rethinking the nature of their relationship with time. To
them, time is every bit as tangible, every bit as measurable, and every bit as valu-
able as money.
Id.
81. See generally BROWN, supra note 66 (analyzing disclosure requirements under federal
securities laws and courts interpretations of such regulations).
82. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
83. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,448-49 (1976). In TSCIndustries,
the Court considered a 14a-9 claim alleging that a proxy statement submitted to shareholders
concerning a proposed merger was incomplete and materially misleading. Id. at 441. The com-
plaint alleged, among other claims, that TSC had failed to disclose that the purchaser of the
company, National Industries, Inc., was the "parent" company of TSC and that members of
TSC's board of directors were also officers of National Industries, Inc. Id. at 451. The Court
concluded that such omissions were not misleading because the additional facts were not
necessary to determine that National Industries was intertwined with TSC prior to the merger.
Id. at 452-53. However, in doing so, the Court provided the modem test for what will be
deemed material by stating that "[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote." Id. at 449.
The Court constructed this test with recognition of the fact that a lower standard of materiality
might encourage companies to disclose too much information to investors, thus leading to the
problem of information overload. Id. at 448-49.
84. Id.
380
CORPORATE WEBSITES, HYPERLNK5, AND RULE 10(B)-5 381
should encourage companies to review information more carefully. Although
the public may still find themselves making impulse stock purchases based on
overwhelming amounts of materials, requiring that companies review this
information on a continuous basis for errors or misstatements may reduce the
pitfalls of impulsive stock purchasing.
B. Deterrence ofLink-Shopping
Often, the number of links and visitors to the site determines the credibil-
ity or "value" of a website.85 For example, many sites utilize "counter" soft-
ware to reflect the total number of "hits" (visits) received; companies that
market such software have seen demand for their products explode with the
growth of the Internet."6 Websites featuring analyst's reports are not immune
from this method of valuation; many ofthe on-line brokerage companies, such
as E-Trade and Ameritrade, attempt to differentiate themselves based upon the
depth and scope of their research and analyst materials.' Because of the close
relationship between analysts and company officers, analysts have an eco-
nomic incentive to report positively on a company's outlook in order to
encourage that company to link to their site." As a result, the total amount of
traffic to the site increases.8 9 However, this incentive may have the effect of
distorting the validity of the information contained in such reports; a process
of "link-shopping" may overcome an analyst's neutrality in his or her assess-
ment of a company's prospects for future growth.9 In order to deter link-
85. See Celia & Stark, supra note 6, at 822 (discussing use of hyperlinks as mechanism
for improving perceived validity of fraudulent website). By the term "link-shopping," this Note
refers to the process of improving a site's value and credibility by increasing the total number
of visits, this can be accomplished by establishing as many access points to the site as possible.
If each hyperlink constitutes a different access point, sites have an incentive to increase the total
number available and thus will cater to those who can provide such hyperlinks.
86. See Smith, supra note 78, at 609-10 (explaining that "[h]yperlinks are the essence of
the Internet system and the validity of a website is often determined by the extent to -which it
is hyperlinked").
87. See Diba, supra note 24, at 113 (discussing access to institutional research as differ-
entiating factor among competing online brokers).
88. See Roger . Dennis, Materiality and the Efficient CapitalMarketModel. A Recipe
for the TotalMix, 25 W .& MARY L. REV. 373,414 (1984) (arguing that relationship between
management and analysts necessarily is close and should be encouraged by regulatory structure).
89. See Langevoort, supra note 76, at 779 (discussing interaction between analysts and
corporate officers and incentive of analysts to maintain cordial relationships with such officers).
90. See Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 518 (7th Cir. 1989) (con-
eluding that "[i]ssuers and underwriters must decide what information will be useful without
burying investors under a blizzard of paper .... No investor absorbs sheafs of dense type....
They require absorption by professional traders and investors"). The role of analyst reports in
transforming the volume of corporate information into digestible materials in the securities
markets cannot be understated.
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shopping by analysts, courts should require companies to review the contents
of analyst reports. Such action would eliminate the incentive of analysts to
inflate their projections in order to garner more links to their site.
C. The Products Liability Rationale
The Internet has provided a quick, efficient, and economical way for
companies to distribute information to the public, much like mass production
reduced the cost of business for manufacturers." In the modern information
age, knowledge and data are often the most valuable commodities to a com-
pany, regardless of its size.' Products liability law has evolved to place the
burden and risk of error on the manufacturer because the manufacturer gains
the most from the use of the supply chain.' Likewise, courts should impose
a similar risk and burden on companies that choose to distribute information
through the Interet "supply" chain.
94
The seminal case that expounded the policy rationale for strict liability
in tort is Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.95 In that case, a waitress was
injured when a Coca Cola bottle broke in her hand.9 In a concurring opinion,
91. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern
Securities Regulation, 52 Bus. LAW. 1195, 1195 (1997) (noting that increase in total Internet
users has reached between thirty and sixty million worldwide and likely will continue to grow).
Coffee argued that concurrent with the growth of the number of Internet users is a reduction in
the number offlltration channels, writing:
Earlier technological innovations (such as the telephone) seem to have assisted the
issuer more than the investor, allowing the former to target the latter. In contrast,
while the Internet may assist the prospective issuer to access the market, it does even
more to enable the investor to obtain significantly more information without filtra-
tion by brokers or other securities professionals who may have a self-interest in
promoting transactions.... [Investors] can also engage in new non-linear browsing
strategies through hyperlink features that connect related materials.
Id. at 1197.
92. See Fromson, supra note 2, at 185 (recognizing that industries in which knowledge
represents largest input to production, rather than labor, dominate economy).
93. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing evolution of strict liability
in tort).
94. See Gavis, supra note 22, at 321 (noting that "[c]oncurrent with corporate America's
realization that the Internet provides a new distribution channel for communicating with the
public, financial service industries ... have all begun to incorporate the Internet into their
strategic plans.... [T]he Internet presents an entirely new mechanism for the interaction of these
entities with the public"). The value of the Internet to small companies for the distribution of
information cannot be understated.
95. 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944).
96. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 437 (Cal. 1944). In Escola, a
waitress brought suit against the bottling company of a beverage which had exploded in her
hand. Id. at 437. A majority of the court provided recovery for the plaintiff based on the theory
of res ispa loquitor. Id. at 440. Justice Traynor, writing separately, would have allowed the
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Justice Traynor concluded that manufacturers should be strictly liable for
injuries resulting from products they had placed into the stream of com-
merce.' The comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A
echo a similar policy rationale, explaining that 'tthe justification for the strict
liability has been said to be that... public policy demands that the burden of
accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed
upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production."'8
The Internet serves as a similar stream of commerce for companies
wishing to market information. By placing a hyperlink on one site to another,
a company directs public consumption towards the information contained on
the second site. In other securities contexts the SEC has recognized that a
corporation implicitly can represent an analyst's report as reliable." The use
of a link to a report serves as tangible evidence of this representation. Bor-
rowing from products liability jurisprudence, courts may find that this link,
insofar as it provides economic benefits to the company, also should serve as
a source of liability to be treated as a cost of production.
D. The Decline ofIntermediary Information Filters
Traditionally, the public could evaluate information based upon the ease
of access to it."0 For example, the public would likely consider information
in the New York Times more reliable than contradictory information published
in more politically radical journals simply because the New York Times reached
a larger audience. However, the Internet has radically destabilized this "hege-
monic" domination of information providers."' To the average investor, the
majority of websites are similar.°  There is no intermediary to adequately
plaintiff to recover by holding the defendant strictly liable in tort, based upon the inherent
dangers to consumers and the benefits provided to manufacturers by automation. Id. at 443
(Traynor, J., concurring).
97. Id. (Traynor, J., concurring).
98. RESTATiENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt c(1987).
99. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (discussing implicit adoption of analyst
reports by distribution).
100. See Dennis, supra note 88, at 414 (discussing effect analysts, especially prominent
ones, can have on price of security in secondary market).
101. See Cielusniak, supra note 6, at 626-27 (discussing concept of anonymity on Internet
as means by which fraudulent traders may manipulate public access to information).
102. Id. at 628. Cielusniak contended that because investors cannot adequately distinguish
between professional and amateur websites, combined with the speed of information delivery,
there exists a high potential for Interet-based fraud, arguing that the Internet is "the modernized
version of the boiler room." Id. Cielusniak argued that
Although investors can use the Internet as a place for obtaining information, advice,
and opportunities, it has also become a new medium for fraud. By some estimates,
Internet investors are defrauded of over U.S. $100 million per year. For a variety
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evaluate the information on an analyst's webpage; one website may seerjust
as credible as another, especially when the topic is complex economic evalua-
tions of a company.
Although the analyst's employer often serves as a gauge of the report's
credibility, this gauge has less value to the average investor. 3 The majority
ofthe public pauses only briefly to see who wrote a report, and instead hurries
to the conclusion page to discover the analyst's recommendation.1o4 Thus,
because the potential for fraudulent information conveyance is great, courts
should protect the public from the lack of a hegemonic information filter by
creating incentives for companies to evaluate data on sites to which they link.
IV Avoiding HyperLiability: Strategies for Corporate Counsel
Given the possibility that courts may find a company liable for fraud
under Rule lOb-5 when its website contains a link to a misleading or incorrect
analyst report, one obvious solution to liability would be to avoid establishing
the hyperlink altogether. However, such a blanket prohibition may hinder the
development of the Internet as a tool for companies to disseminate information
to the public. By hyperlinking an analyst's report, a company may gain numer-
ous advantages. First, hyperlinking offers small companies the opportunity to
attract potential investors at a low cost of information delivery by supplanting
the need for costly paper-based mailings."5 Second, it provides a mechanism
for companies to capitalize on the quick decisionmaking process of investors
by encouraging them to read the analyst reports and then immediately purchase
shares of the company. " Finally, it provides corporations a streamlined
of reasons, the Internet provides an ideal setting for fraud. The cost of setting up
an Internet webpage is decreasing, as is the cost for an investor to access the Inter-
net. Both of these aspects, together, lower the barriers to entry, and the Internet
becomes a much less expensive way for scam artists to find victims than by using
traditional techniques such as mass mailing and cold-calling.
Ia. at 627-28.
103. SeeKevin Mason, Comment, Securities Fraud on the Internet The Flies in the Oint-
ment and a Hope of FlyPaper, 30 CAsE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 489,498 (1998) (discussing value
of anonymity on Internet and investment calculus of public when evaluating data posted in
newsgroups). But see Cregory C. Yadley, The Challenges of Technology: The Regulators'
Response to Securities Offerings on the Internet, SB69 AL.I-AJ3.A 189, 197 (1997) (quoting
SEC Commissioner M.H. Wallman's assertion that investment decisions by public do not influ-
ence discussions on chat-boards and other Internet rumors).
104. See Cielumiak supra note 6, at 612 (arguing that speed and volume of Intemet infor-
mation delivery can overwhelm average member of public seeking reliable investment advice
and strategies).
105. See id. at 618-19 (discussing value oflatemet to corporations).
106. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing effect of Internet on reflec-
tive process of investors).
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communication method to reach investors - they can deliver both required
disclosure materials and optional soft communications (such as analyst reports)
to investors without the associated cost of maintaining two information deliv-
ery infrastructures.1° Thus, a more flexible solution than eliminating links -
one that would shield the corporate client from liability while maintaining the
viability of links to analyst reports - would be optimal. 8 The mechanisms
discussed below may be combined in different fhshions in order to tailor the
solution to the particular client's needs and desires.
A. The Utility of Staleness Provisions
Because the information contained on a website constantly is reaffirmed
as valid each day that a link to a site exists," 9 companies may choose to make
clear to visitors that the data on linked sites is only valid for a certain period
of time, after which it can be deemed to be stale."' This staleness provision
107. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text (discussing communication of in-
formation to investors by corporations through Internet).
108. See MarkA. Metz, Don'tGetToo Comfy With ThatHomePage, Bus. L. TODAY, July/
Aug. 1998, at 61-62 (arguing that companies should never link to analyst reports from corporate
home page). Metz's advice is from the perspective of an attorney seeking to minimize the
potential liability of clients; it fails to take into account the business needs of publicly traded
companies and the competitive advantage that hyperlinked analyst reports may provide. Id. at
61-63. Metz provided a comprehensive checklist concerning advice with respect to a client's
corporate homepage, which includes the following:
1. Designate a member ofthe upper management to review the information posted
on the home page on a periodic basis and after any significant development at
the company. Correct any errors and delete all noncurrent information.
2. State the date ofthe most recent update of the information in the home page and
include a disclaimer of responsibility for inaccuracies and omissions as a result
of events occurring after that date.
3. Minimize the amount of forward-looking and other information requiring fre-
quent updating.
4. Avoid including analysts' reports and hyperlinks to third-party materials.
5. Avoid including material information about the company that has not been pub-
licly disseminated by means of a press release or SEC reports.
6. Avoid including a chat room in the home page. If one is included, strongly
discourage employees from participating in it.
7. Avoid statements that could be considered a general solicitation of investors.
8. Review the home page prior to commencing any public or private securities
offering.
Id. at 62.
109. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing role of hyperlinks as
mechanism through which courts may find implied adoption).
110. See Mason, supra note 103, at 494 (analyzing use of password and gateway system
as mechanism for reduced liability). The staleness provision (or disclaimer, as later discussed)
could be communicated to the visitor by a "pop-up" window when the hyperlink is accessed.
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may reduce the risk that a court will find a continuous duty to correct informa-
tion."' Absent such a staleness provision, information that remains easily
accessible and unchanged may be subject to valid reliance by investors, and
a document may remain "alive" long after it otherwise would have."'
The requirement that a statement be "alive" in order to provide the basis
for a valid lOb-5 claim finds its guiding principles inRoss v. A.H. Robins Co.,
Inc."3 In Ross, the district court considered a shareholders' lOb-5 claim
against a pharmaceutical company. The case concerned statements, made in
the company's 1970 Annual Report, that indicated a product, the Dalkon
Shield, was a safe and effective birth control device." 4 The shareholders, who
had purchased stock in the company in 1973, argued that they had done so in
reliance upon the 1970 statements.1 The Shield did not perform as expected,
but the company failed to correct the previous statements concerning the effi-
cacy of the device until 1974.116
The court needed to distinguish between the statements that triggered a
continuing duty to correct and those statements that did not; for example, a
press release issued years ago at some point ceases to be accurate and thus is
invalid as a basis for reliance. 7 A failure to make this distinction would be
Id. Before the link is completed, the investor could be required to acknowledge that he or she
is a sophisticated investor who understands that the information contained on the linked website
may be either incorrect or outdated. IPONet utilized a similar approach to place public offer-
ings of securities over the Internet Id, at 494. Such a "gateway" likely would deter courts from
finding reasonable reliance on the part of an investor who had agreed to such a statement before
viewing linked analyst reports.
111. See BROWN, supra note 66, § 4.04 n.49 (discussing use of staleness rule as means to
limit corporate liability with respect to electronic media).
112. See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing doctrine of
"alive" statements as component of reliance in 10b-5 actions). By the use of the term "alive,"
this Note refers to the measure of time upon which an investor can reasonably rely on a state-
ment
113. 465 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.
1979).
114. Ross v. AHL. Robins Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 904, 906 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), rev'd on
other grounds, 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979). In Ross, the court considered whether statements
made in a 1970 annual report could be the basis for reliance by an investor who decided to
purchase stock in 1973. Id. at 908. The specific statements indicated that the product, the
Dalkon Shield, was developing "significant market appeal and arguably projected a favor-
able future for the Shield." Id. The court concluded that the passage of time alone was not
sufficient to render a statement invalid as a basis for reliance. Id. In reaching this conclusion,
the Ross court restricted the duty to correct misleading statements to only those that remained
"alive." Id.
115. Id. at 906-07.
116. Id.
117. Id. at907.
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unreasonably burdensome and would overwhelm investors with enormous
amounts of relatively useless information, risking the "overload" concerns of
the TSC Industries Court.118 Thus, the court added the requirement that the
statement be "alive" in order to maintain a 1Ob-5 motion."'
Therefore, a statement remains "alive" so long as it continues to engender
reliance. 2' Determining when reliance has ended is not always easy.12' In
some instances, reliance ceases to be reasonable once the purpose of disclo-
sure has ended." For example, a proxy statement will be considered to be no
longer alive after its mailing unless evidence can be presented to show that the
company was aware of the misleading statements at the time the proxy state-
ment was presented." Informal communications, on the other hand, create
determinations that are more difficult.2 Although "soft" communications
may cease to be "alive" after the passage of time," courts have yet to devise
118. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (discussing concept of "information
overload" as addressed by TSC Industries Court).
119. Ross, 465 F. Supp. at 908.
120. See Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir. 1971) (discussing
concept of reliance in discussion of length of time statement reasonably could be relied upon).
121. See Ross v. AIL Robins Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 904,908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (discuss-
ing period upon which reliance may be reasonable). The Ross court noted that
[Logic compels the conclusion that time may render statements immaterial and end
any duty to correct or revise them. In measuring the effect of time in a particular
instance, the type of later information and the importance of earlier information
contained in a prior statement must be considered. Thus, general financial informa-
tion in a two-year old annual report may be stale and immaterial.... However, no
general rule of time can be applied to all circumstances.
Id.
122. See Series Feldman & David Priebe,SecuritiesLitigation andRecentDevelopments-
FederalSecuriies Law and the Internet, MONDAQ Bus. BRIUEING, July 3,1998, at 4 (contend-
ing that duty to update should apply to statements on webpage).
123. See Kennedy v. Chomerics, Inc., 669 F. Supp. 1157,1161 (D. Mass. 1987) (detennin-
ing that reliance on proxy statement, however misleading, was invalid as not "alive" given that
company's Board of Directors was not aware of misleading statements at time they distributed
proxy statement).
124. Compare Bane One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d. 1187,1193 (Sth Cir.
1995) (holding that seller in "all or none" offering does have continuing duty to inform investors
of facts after initial commitment to invest) with Hillson Partners Ltd. P'ship v. Adage, Inc., Civ.
No. S 93-2315, 1994 WL 724924, at *6 (D. Md. Jan. 5, 1994) (finding company did not have
duty to update error with respect to immaterial information).
125. See Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1489-90 n.13 (D.
Del. 1984) (discussing reasonable length of time upon which investor may rely on statement).
The Warner court reasoned in a footnote that
In the absence of a limit on the continuing materiality of public statements by
corporations or management, any misrepresentations in a statement could poten-
tially result in liability to all investors who, at anytime thereafter, engage in trsnsac-
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a bright line test for the resolution of this issue.126 Instead, courts tend to
analyze the facts and circumstances of each particular case to determine
whether a statement should be considered "alive." "l In doing so, two factors
become important in determining whether reliance is reasonable, especially
in the context of a hyperlink to an analyst's report: the type of information
disclosed and the circumstances of the disclosure."
With respect to the type of information disclosed, courts generally have
required that companies correct forward-looking statements, such as projec-
tions or analyst reports, once they are no longer accurate; such statements
tend to have a "life-span" much longer than other types of information. 130 For
example, in In re Time Warner Inc. Securities Litigation,' the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that "a duty to update opinions and
projections may arise if the original opinions or projections have become mis-
leading as the result of intervening events."" The court distinguished be-
tions in the company's stock. At some point, such a result would not only be harsh,
but simply absurd.
Id.
126. See id. (noting unwillingness to commit to any specific time period as determinative
of expiration of reliance period).
127. See Ross v. A.H- Robins Co., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 904, 908 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting
that in measuring time that statement remains "alive," court should consider type and context
of information disclosed).
128. See infra notes 129-52 and accompanying text (discussing different types of informa-
tion and circumstances of disclosure).
129. See In re Home Health Corp. See. Litig., No. 98-834, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1230
(E-D. Pa. Jan. 29, 1999) (concluding Section 10(b) imposes duty to correct both historical and
forward looking earnings projections (citing In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F3d
1410,1433-34 (3d Cir. 1997))). Butsee Hillson, 1997 WL 724924, at *6 (arguing duty to cor-
rect projections would discourage disclosure that securities laws seek to encourage).
130. See Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F3d 160, 170 n.41 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that in
context of projections "it appears that defendants have a duty under Rule 10b-5 to correct state-
ments if those statements have become materially misleading in light of subsequent events");
In re Kulicke & Soffa Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 697 F. Supp. 183,185 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (recogniz-
ing duty to correct projections that subsequently become misleading); see also In re Nations-
Mart Corp. See. Litig., 130 F3d 309,321 (8th. Cir. 1997) (noting that some courts have found
duty to correct or update statements once incorrect). But see In re Gen. Instrument Corp. Sec.
Litig., No. 96-C-1129, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14855, at *26 (N.D. Ml1. Sept. 23, 1997) (recog-
nizing no duty exists in Seventh Circuit to correct projections that are incorrect due to unex-
pected reasons); Wallace v. Sys. & Computer Tech. Corp., No. 95-CV-6303, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14677, at *73 n.43 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23,1997) (determining that there is no duty to update
"run-of-the-mill earnings projections").
131. 9F3d259(2dCir. 1993).
132. In re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F3d. 259,267 (2d Cir. 1993). In Time Warner,
the Second Circuit considered statements made by company officials indicating that talks with
potential merger candidates were likely to be successful. Id. at 262. After such talks failed to
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tween definite statements that may engender reliance, such as earnings fore-
casts, and more ambiguous statements of company policy."' With respect to
definitive statements of company projections, such as those contained in
analyst reports, the court was willing to considerthe time such statements were
to be "alive" as much longerthan other types of statements."M Similarly, in the
context of a hyperlink to an analyst's report, courts are likely to consider the
material to be "alive" for a longer period.1 35 As a result, courts are likely to find
that less obvious actions by a company ratifying this information serve as a
reasonable basis for reliance.'36 In Time Warner, the court's decision could
lead future courts to conclude that the seemingly innocuous presence of a
hyperlink may be interpreted as sufficient to establish to potential investors
that the report is valid every day thatthe hyperlink continues to exist."
Courts also will analyze the circumstances of disclosure to determine
whether a particular statement is still "alive." 3" When a company discloses
information in such a way that it is virtually guaranteed to reach a significant
audience, courts are more likely to impose a duty to correct subsequent errors
than if the statements were thinly distributed.!39 For example, in In re Merid-
ian Securities Litigation,14° the court reached a similar conclusion.' 4' In that
materialize in a profitable merger, the plaintiff sought to bring a lob-5 claim for failure to
correct the previous statements concerning the status of the merger discussions. Id. at 261. The
court drew a distinction between statements that made definitive positive projections, such as
earnings forecasts or analyst reports, and more ambiguous statements concerning company
prospects, such as the statements at issue, concluding that the latter failed to provide enough
factual basis to support a finding of reasonable reliance. Id. at 267. Thus, the court dismissed
the plainff's claim with respect to the failure to correct the statements concerning merger talks
that had yet even to commence. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See Feldman & Pricbe, supra note 122, at 4 (arguing that information on web page
engenders investor reliance for longer period of time).
136. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing hyperlink as non-verbal
form of communication that may give rise to implied adoption of third party statement).
137. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (discussing hyperlink and possibility
of finding of implied adoption).
138. SeeIn re GulfQil/Cities Serv. Tender OfferLitig., 725 F. Supp. 712,748-49 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (stating that in context of previously disclosed merger agreement, subsequent change of
heart triggered duty to correct information).
139. See generally Capri Optics Profit Sharing v. Digital Equip. Corp. 950 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.
1991) (finding disclosure of future profit projections to investors as potentially misleading from
investors' standpoint, although court did not find violation in this case due to circumstances of
disclosure).
140. 772 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
141. See In re Meridian See. Litig., 772 F. Supp. 223,227 (ED. Pa. 1991) (discussing lack
of disclosure and duty to correct misleading statements). In Meridian, the court considered
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case, public statements made by the officers and the directors of the corpora-
tion concerning the company's potential earnings were at issue.142 Finding
that senior management made the statements to the entirety of the public, the
court was willing to discount the fact that the information disclosed was "soft"
rather than definitive statements of financial conditions. 43 Thus, the court
imposed a duty to correct on the corporation based solely upon the circum-
stances of disclosure.1 " Had the company provided the "soft' information in
a limited press conference by a lower-level employee, the court likely would
have been more hesitant to impose such a duty.4 In the context of a com-
pany's website, a court is likely to view the medium of communication as a
wide-ranging distribution, similar to the full public disclosure made by
Meridian officers. 4 Thus, even if information to which a company's website
is linked can be argued to be "sot," the circumstances of disclosure may still
trigger a duty to correct - the statements will be considered to be alive for as
long as the hyperlink exists.147
A problem arises when a company wishes to sever itself from a statement
that might engender reliance. Two potential solutions may allow a company
to maintain the hyperlink yet avoid the problem of "extended life" conferred
to the information by the hyperlink.'" First, a clear statement on the analyst's
page should indicate that the information should only be considered current
as of the publication date and that subsequent events may have intervened to
make the report inaccurate.1 49 This disclaimer would prevent investors from
public statements made by directors of the corporation concerning earnings forecasts as they
related to investments in Meridian Bancorp, Inc. Id. at 225. The shareholders' suit claimed that
the directors were under a duty to correct statements made after it was learned that Meridian
Bancorp's title insurance companies were troubled financially. Id. The defendant directors
contended thatthey were under no duty to correct the statements because silence, absence a duty
to disclose, was not misleading. lI at 227. The court determined that the nature of the original
statements, being made by high ranking directors to the entirety of the general public, provided
enough of a basis to create reasonable reliance even though such information was "soft" rather
than firm projections. L at 226.
142. Id. at 225.
143. Id. at 226-27.
144. Id. at 227.
145. Id.
146. See Metz, supra note 108, at 63 (arguing that hyperlink presence means information
is disseminated each time user accesses link).
147. See id. (contending use of hyperlink to another website triggers continual duty to
correct linked information).
148. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text (discussing possible limits to reliance
on website information).
149. See BROWN, supra note 66, § 9.03[2] (discussing dating of disclaimer as potential
strategy to avoid liability).
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claiming that the report engendered reasonable reliance.50 Second, compa-
nies should insist that any analyst's website to which they provide a hyperlink
undergo periodic archiving, that is, the removal of older information to a
clearly marked "archive" file."' Such a policy would sever the capability of
the hyperlink to grant an "extended life" to information that otherwise would
be deemed to have become "dead" with the passage of time.'52 By incorporat-
ing these solutions into their website management practices, companies may
begin to eliminate the extended life generated by Internet distribution of
analyst materials.
B. Disclaimers - The HyperLiability "Et Strategy"
The second potential solution that would allow companies to maintain a
hyperlink as a mechanism of information communication but still avoid the
possibility of liability through entanglement is to use a general disclaimer. 3
Such a disclaimer would indicate that the company provides links to the
analyst reports only as an information service, but does not endorse their
accuracy and, accordingly, visitors should view such information and act upon
it at their own risk.154 Generally, courts have been unwilling to recognize such
disclaimers as effective within the scope of securities law. 55 However, three
different lines of cases support an interpretation that would give legal effect




153. See generally Prentice, supra note 3, at 62-4 (discussing role of disclaimers as related
to website liability for companies with home pages). Prentice suggested a disclaimer should
conform to the following model:
XYZ provides links to the analyst reports listed below as a service to those inter-
ested in this information. XYZ does not endorse these reports and can make no
guarantee as to their accuracy or completeness. Users visit the analysts' Web sites
at their own risk. Those interested in investing in XYZ are directed to the materials
filed with the SEC by XYZ.
Id. at 62.
154. SeeLawrenceHertz, Top Ten Cyber-CommandmentsforWebsiteLegalPage, CYBER-
SPACE LAW., Apr. 1997, at 5 (supporting use of similar disclaimer for any material posted at
linked site). Hertz acknowledged that the legal effectiveness of such disclaimers is uncertain.
Id.
155. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 63 (arguing that policies underlying Rule 10b-5 are
inconsistent with recognition of disclaimers as effective waivers of liability).
156. See infra notes 157-78 and accompanying text (discussing secondary liability, dis-
claimers of fraud, and merger doctrine as possible support for use of disclaimers to avoid
hyperlink liability); see also Robert A. Prentice, Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtualty Non-
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1. A Consideration of Secondary Liability
Some courts have indicated a willingness to absolve a person of liability
when the only cause of action is aiding another person's communication for
the commission of fraud; 5 7 aiding another person does not provide the basis
for an actionable claim based upon secondary liability."" In Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank ofDenver,15 9 the Supreme Court determined
that the language in Rule lOb-5 imposing liability for "directly or indirectly"
violating the statute did not include liability for aiding and abetting.16 In that
case, the Supreme Court considered the general question of whether liability
should attach to a person who had endorsed the communication of another
who intentionally had misrepresented the value of a security but who had
made such an endorsement without knowledge of the misrepresentation.6'
After discussing how to construct properly the "directly or indirectly" lan-
guage in Rule lOb-5, the Court determined that:
Existent"Line Between Primary and Secondary Liabilifty Under Section 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV.
691, 776 (1997) (criticizing distinction between primary and secondary liability). Prentice
argued that Rule lOb-5 liability should be imposed on the following persons:
[Those who (a) make false representations or omissions themselves; (b) by their
visible and substantial participation in another's communications impliedly vouch
for the accuracy of those statements, (c) participate substantially in another's false
statements (or omissions) knowing that they are false and will be shown to investors
who will rely on them; and (d) fail, in very limited circumstances, to blow the
whistle on fraud when they have a duty to do so ....
Id. at 776.
157. See, e.g., Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 1996)
(imposing no liability for aiding and abetting actions under Rule lob-5 (citing Cent Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank ofDenver, 114 S.Ct 1439,1455 (1994))); Lycan v. Walters, 904
F. Supp. 884,901 n.12 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (same).
158. See Prentice, supra note 156, at 63-64 (providing general discussion of secondary
versus primary liability strand of cases).
159. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
160. Cent Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 176-77
(1994). In Central Bank the Court considered a claim by the respondents that Central Bank
had violated Rule lob-5 by delaying a review of an appraisal of bonds issued by a client to
whom Central Bank served as indenture trustee for the issue. Id. at 167-68. Although it was
clear that Central Bank's client had violated the Rule by intentionally misrepresenting the value
of the bonds in light of the declining prices in the local real estate market, it was unclear
whether Central Bank should be held secondarily liable for delaying an appraisal of the bonds'
value where the Bank was unaware of the intentional misrepresentation of their value. Ma The
Court resolved the issue by examining the "directly or indirectly" language used in the Rule and
concluded that because Congress knew how to explicitly include liability for aiding and abetting
actions, the lack of such an explicit inclusion in this case meant they did not intend to do so.
Id. at 176-77.
161. Id. at 167-68.
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Extending the lOb-5 cause of action to aiders and abettors no doubt makes
the civil remedy far more reaching, but it does not follow that the objec-
tives of the statute are better served. Secondary liability for aiders and
abettors exacts costs that may disserve the goals offair dealing and effi-
ciency in the securities markets."
The language of Central Bank suggests that a disclaimer embodies the
same lack of scienter that was present in the aforementioned case, such that
a disclaimer serves to insulate a company from liability for misrepresentations
of which they know nothing and to which their only contact is the presence of
a hyperlink. Of course, such a disclaimer would only be viable when the
company had not given any information to or reviewed any findings of the
analyst."e In such cases there would be more substantial evidence of knowl-
edge of the misleading information." Thus, secondary liability would not be
the basis of a lOb-5 claim. 6s However, when the misstatements occur as a
result of changes on an analyst's page of which the company is unaware, a
disclaimer may be a powerful tool to avoid liability.
2. Professional Disclaimers ofFraud
The second line of cases that may insulate a company from liability
through the use of a disclaimer concerns other professional occupations' use
of disclaimers of fraud."6 For example, courts have upheld disclaimers as
effective when included as part of attorney statements and when such dis-
claimers reflected the fact that the attorney's communications were merely
restatements of information provided by a client."6 In such cases, courts have
refused to impose liability when disclaimers were present on the grounds that
162. Id. at 188.
163. See supra notes 48-65 and accompanying text (discussing entanglement as basis for
implied adoption). Once entanglement exists, the court presumes the company to have made
the statements itsel even if the communication is originally the product of a third party. Id.
164. IcL
165. Id. In cases in which entanglement allegedly is basis of the company's adoption of
a communication, the lOb-5 claim would contend that the statements were made directly by the
company.
166. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 64-66 (discussing professional disclaimers of fraud).
167. See Fortson v. Winstead, McGuire, Sechrest & Minick, 961 F.2d 469,475 (4th Cir.
1992) (determining that imposing duty ofresponsibility on attorneys for client statements would
artificially inflate costs of legal counsel involved in commercial trnsactions); Moorhead v. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 949 F.2d 243,245-46 (8th Cir. 1991) (giving effect to
cautionary statements in defendant's feasibility study). But see Turkish v. Kasenetz, 27 F.3d 23,
27-28 (2d Cir. 1994) (determining that disclaimers are ineffective insofar as they shield defen-
dant from his own fraudulent conduct); Kline v. First W. Gov't See., Inc., 24 F3d 480,488 (3d
Cir. 1994) (refusing to give effect to disclaimer due to reasonableness of plaintiff's reliance on
attorney's opinion).
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failure to do so would alter the role of the disclaiming party from conveyor of
information to watchdog for information seeking parties.s Moreover, a fail-
ure to give effect to an attorney's disclaimer would make "a party... liable
for unlimited information even though it would be well beyond the matter for
which it was retained."' 9
A disclaimer on a company website arguably serves a similar function as
the attorney fraud disclaimers in the aforementioned cases. Especially in
cases in which the company is unaware of the errors in the analyst report,
courts likely will give the disclaimer great prophylactic effect; 70 for courts to
do otherwise would convert the role of the public company to the that of the
SEC - monitoring disclosure of information by securities traders."' Even
when a company is aware of errors in the report, a disclaimer may still shield
the company from liability for such errors just as it does for attorneys."2 Even
when a company knows of the mistakes, the disclaimer, if properly drafted
and clearly displayed, would indicate that the report is the sole product of the
analyst and its conclusions and information are not the responsibility or
product of any actions taken by the company.1 3 An appropriate disclaimer
should serve to eliminate the possibility of reasonable reliance by the investor,
a claim that cannot be saved by merely pointing to a hyperlink and citing
entanglement jurisprudence.
3. The Use of the Merger Doctrine
Finally, the merger doctrine may provide justification for the enforcement
of disclaimers on a website. The merger doctrine, as applied by most courts,
insulates a company from fraudulent and intentional acts of its employees
when a company incorporates a disclaimer into all contracts and transactions
withthe plaintiff'174 One commentator has described the doctrine as merely an
168. See Fortson, 961 F.2d at 475 (concluding that "[t]he end result would have attorneys
stand as the guarantors of integrity in all commercial transactions... [Il]awyers, in short, would
function in the business world as designated watchdogs").
169. Id. at 475 (quoting Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d. 646, 654 (9th
Cir. 1988)).
170. See Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 803-05 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding
plaintiff barred from reliance on oral statements at odds with written offering memorandum).
171. See Fortson, 961 F.2d at 475 (expressing concern over shifting monitoring duties to
those outside regulatory capacities).
172. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 66 (concluding that courts likely will reach similar
conclusion based on analogy to attorney disclaimers of fraud).
173. See Metz, supra note 108, at 64 (advocating use of carefully drafted disclaimer on
corporate websites).
174. See Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that plaintiff
may not recover based on misrepresentations by employees when contract explicitly excluded
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application of the parol evidence rule to the securities context: Written dis-
claimers shall be given precedence over oral statements of fraud concerning the
sale of securities. 7 ' For example, if an investor purchases securities from a
broker relying on statements made in a discussion with that broker, but existing
in the purchase agreement is a clause indicating that the investor made the
purchase without relying on any information provided by the broker, courts
will use the merger doctrine to insulate the broker from lob-5 claims. 1'76
A company's disclaimer on a website concerning a hyperlink to an ana-
lyst's report could function in a similar manner. A company could construct
the disclaimer in such a way that every time the link is "clicked" the disclaimer
would appear and require the viewer to acknowledge it before the analyst's
page would appear. If constructed in such a fashion, the disclaimer arguably
would function as a written agreement similar to the one outlined in the above
hypothetical situation. In such a case, the merger doctrine would fiction to
give precedence to the implied adoption by the hyperlink of the validity of the
analyst report; the reasonability of the reliance of the investor would be elimi-
nated by an express agreement to the contrary.1 " Given the relative ease with
which courts uphold disclaimers based on all three theories,' corporate
counsel would be well-advised to incorporate easily seen and carefully worded
disclaimers with every hyperlink installed.
C. Docking in a Safe Harbor: The 1995 PSLRA
In December 1995 Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act (PSLRA).'79 The PSLRA contained important provisions con-
such claims); Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d. 1020, 1033 (2d Cir. 1993) (deciding
that cautionary statements included in prospectus insulated defendant from 1Ob-5 claim); David-
son v. Wilson, 973 F.2d. 1391, 1401 (8th Cir. 1992) (concluding investors may not reasonably
rely on oral misrepresentations where contradictory written disclaimers are present). But see
Margaret V. Sachs, Freedom to Contract: The Trojan Horse of Rule 10b-5, 51 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 879, 911-14 (1994) (arguing that merger doctrine defense is inconsistent with policy
of Section 29(a) of 1934 Securities Act). Sachs also contended that the reasonableness of reli-
ance is understated by the merger doctrine given that investors are more likely to give credence
to oral statements made by employees of a brokerage house rather than by volumes of written
materials that they are handed. Id. at 911.
175. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 67 (framing merger doctrine as an application of parol
evidence rule).
176. See id. at 66 (outlining hypothetical situation).
177. See Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., Inc., 814 F.2d 798, 803-05 (1st Cir. 1987) (giving
priority to written disclaimer in offering memorandum over oral misrepresentations).
178. See supra notes 153-76 (discussing potential doctrines by which courts give effect to
disclaimers of liability in context of both securities and other professions).
179. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67 (Dec. 22,1995).
For a discussion of the legislative history surrounding the passage of the Act, see generally John
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cerning a safe harbor for projections and forward-looking statements."' ° The
safe harbor extends to any forward-looking statement identified as such and
"accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifyring important
factors that could cause actual results to differ materially from those in the
forward-looking statement. . ."' 1 Although the Act itself does not define
"meaningfuil cautionary statements," if companies accompany hyperlinks with
such a cautionary statement, they can shield themselves from liability for mis-
statements in any analyst reports." z The question then arises as to what a
company must provide with a hyperlink in order to constitute a "meaningful
cautionary statement."
The legislative history behind the Act indicates that the statement must
contain specific information that would provide investors and others with an
understanding of identifiable factors that could render the forward looking
statement or projections inaccurate. 3 It may be more difficult for a company
to fashion a cautionary statement that would suffice in cases in which the error
in the analyst's report is unknown to the company; a court may not consider a
boilerplate provision indicating that analyst reports may change and contain
misinformation specific enough. 1 4 However, at least one court has found rela-
tively vague disclosure is sufficient to meet the cautionary statement require-
ment.8s If other courts follow suit, the potential for avoiding hyperlink liabil-
W. Avery, SecuritiesLitigation Reform: The Long and WindingRoad to the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of1995, 51 Bus. LAW. 335 (1996) (discussing both original and modified
forms of Act and debate surrounding each before passage).
180. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 §27A. For a judicial interpretation
of the meaning of forward-looking statement under application of the Act, see Harris v. Ivax
Corp., 998 F. Supp. 1449, 1453 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (finding that statements indicative of future
rather than present condition constitute forward-leaning statements under Act).
181. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27A(OX1XA), Pub. L. No. 104-67
(Dec. 22, 1995).
182. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 41-44 (discussing safe harbor provision of PSLRA in
context of electronic communications).
183. See Securities Litigation Reform Act, Conference Report, H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at
43 (1995) (noting that "[t]he cautionary statements must convey substantive information about
factors that realistically could cause results to differ materially from those projected in the
forward-looking statement, such as, for example, information about an issuer's business"); see
also id. at 43-44 (arguing that "[i]mportant' factors means the stated factors identified in the
cautionary statement must be relevant to the projection and must be of a nature that the factor
or factors could actually affect whether the forward-looking statement is realized").
184. See Metz, supra note 108, at 62 (discounting value of boilerplate provisions as capa-
ble of eliminating finding of reliance by courts).
185. See Rasheedi v. Cree Research, Inc., No. 1:96CV00890, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16968, at *4-8 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 17, 1997) (validating press release containing cautionary state-
ments that "actual results may differ" and listing "important factors" that may cause projections
to be inaccurate).
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ity by companies may become as simple as the inclusion of a standardized
boilerplate statement accompanying every hyperlink.
V Conclusion - A Brave New World?
Faced with the growing importance of the Internet to the securities
trading community, the SEC must now realize the significance of adapting its
regulations to the new communication sphere.' 6 As companies begin to make
the majority of their required disclosures and soft information available to the
public through primarily electronic means,"s the need for this adaptation will
grow. Given the incentives for companies to provide links from their website
to detailed financial information for potential investors,' the SEC should
determine how Rule lOb-5 will apply in the context of these hyperlinks.
Initially, the SEC must determine whether the hyperlink itself is to be seen as
a form of nonverbal communication, and if so, how such a communication
interacts with the doctrine of implied adoption.'89
This Note has argued that such an adoption of analyst statements should
be inferred from the presence of a "naked" hyperlink"9 to analyst reports from
a corporation's home page.'9 ' Moreover, this Note has argued that although
this theory would result in an elevated and continual duty to correct and
update information on the linked site, this duty is justified by the benefits the
Internet provides to the corporate world.192 However, to place the entire
burden (and associated liability) on corporations would be exceedingly unfair,
some responsibility must lie with the investor making the actual investment
decision. 93
186. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text (discussing need for SEC adaptation
of securities regulation to Internet).
187. See supra notes 15-21 and accompanying text (describing shift to Internet as primary
means of information delivery by corporate America).
188. See supra notes 105-07 (analyzing potential benefits to corporations by providing
direct hyperlinks to analyst reports). See generally Stan Davis & Christopher Meyer, Ri*yBusi-
ness, BusiNEss 2.0, March, 2000, at 308 (arguing that corporate CEOs spend majority of their
time attempting to manage risks and balance costs against benefits).
189. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text (analyzing hyperlink to analyst reports
as mechanism through which courts may find implicit adoption of analyst statements).
190. By the term "naked" hyperlink, this Note refers to a hyperlink that is not accompanied
by the presence of a disclaimer, staleness provision, or other prophylactic device.
191. See supra notes 66-75 (arguing that hyperlink serves as nonverbal communication
indicating adoption of linked materials).
192. See supra notes 76-104 and accompanying text (providing multiple policy justifica-
tions for implied adoption of third party statements by presence of hyperlink).
193. See supra notes 91-99 (discussing analogy between elevated duty to correct and strict
liability in tort).
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This Note has argued that the best mechanism to place this burden on the
investor is the enforcement of the requirement of reasonable reliance in 1Ob-5
actions. 94 If corporations are use disclaimers, staleness provisions, and
specific cautionary statements, courts are likely to view such measures as pro-
phylactic devices limiting an investors claim to reasonable reliance. 95 In this
manner, companies can dilute the risks associated with the rapid pace of the
information age,196 while at the same time embracing the Internet and the
potential it offers to streamline information delivery into an efficient commu-
nicative system.
Critics may contend that the ever-changing Internet requires a new set of
regulations and guidelines apart from the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934.1'
However, the SEC already has established the basic infrastructure to make the
metamorphosis from a paper-based to an Internet-based regulatory system."
As indicated earlier, the SEC is willing to view electronically delivered docu-
ments in the same light as traditionally delivered disclosure materials.' The
only task thus remaining is to adapt the specific disclosure rules to this view
of document delivery.2"e Intrinsic to this process will be the need to reassess
the burdens the various rules place on particular parties.2"' A successful bal-
ance of these burdens between investors and corporations assures the contin-
ued viability of the application of Rule 1Ob-5 as it faces the rapidly changing
world of the Internet.
194. See supra notes 35-47 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of reliance in
context of lOb-5 claims by plaintiffs).
195. See supra notes 109-85 (analyzing judicial treatment of various devices intended to
shield corporations from liability for hyperlinks to inaccurate analyst reports).
196. See supra notes 76-84 and accompanying text (arguing that rapid access to informa-
tion through Internet poses unique problem of information overload to investors).
197. See Cielusniak, supra note 6, at 613-14 (arguing that current regulatory structure is
inapplicable to Interact securities trading); Smith, supra note 78, at 611 (contending new regu-
latory structure for securities fraud is needed). But see Celia & Stark, supra note 6, at 835
(advocating use of current regulatory schemes for SEC prosecution of securities fraud over
Internet).
198. See Prentice, supra note 3, at 10-12 (discussing enforcement initiatives of SEC
through use of Internet).
199. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing SEC view of hyperlink as
creating single electronic document).
200. See Cella & Stark, supra note 6, at 835-36 (advocating use of expanded surveillance
as tool to discourage and monitor securities fraud over Internet).
201. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (discussing elevated duties arising from
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